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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial on two felony counts and two misdemeanor counts, the jury found
Geoffrey  Claude  Coleman  guilty  of  misdemeanor  exhibition  of  a  deadly  weapon.   On  appeal,
Mr. Coleman asserts the district court erred when it denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 29 (Rule 29)
motion for a judgment of acquittal regarding the exhibition of a deadly weapon count.  The State
did not present competent evidence that Mr. Coleman exhibited a deadly weapon in the presence
of two or more persons, as required by the applicable statute, I.C. § 18-3303.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Coleman by Information with one count of aggravated battery,
felony, I.C. §§ 18-903(a) and 18-907(b), one count of exhibition of a deadly weapon,
misdemeanor, I.C. § 18-3303, one count of grand theft, felony, I.C. §§ 18-2403(1) and 18-
2407(1)(d), and one count of malicious injury to property, misdemeanor, I.C. § 18-7001.
(R., pp.47-50.)  Mr. Coleman entered a not guilty plea to the charges.  (R., pp.56-57.)
The case proceeded to a jury trial.  (R., pp.111-32.)  Mr. Coleman’s father,
Richard Coleman, testified he had invited his son and his son’s girlfriend to Christmas dinner at
his home.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.96, L.18 – p.100, L.21.)  The GMC Jimmy SUV Mr. Coleman had
been driving became stuck in the snow at the base of Richard Coleman’s driveway.  (Tr. Vol. I,
p.110, L.17 – p.111, L.6.)  Richard Coleman testified that after he and Mr. Coleman towed the
Jimmy out of the snow with another vehicle, his son argued with him and pushed him onto the
ground several times.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.120, L.17 – p.126, L.4.)  Richard Coleman testified he
then got onto the ATV he had been using to plow the driveway, but Mr. Coleman knocked him
off the ATV, backed it up, and ran it over him.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.126, L.5 – p.133, L.15.)
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Richard Coleman sustained injuries to his hands and legs.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.136, L.8 – p.144,
L.10.)
According to Richard Coleman, after his son backed the ATV off him, his son’s
girlfriend asked if he was hurt, but his son did not say anything.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.144, L.19 –
p.145, L.2.)  He testified that he thought Mr. Coleman then drove off in the Jimmy.  (Tr. Vol. I,
p.146, Ls.8-21.)  Richard Coleman testified he called law enforcement, and officers arrived at the
scene.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.148, L.11 – p.149, L.7.)  After the officers took his statement at his
house, they left.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.149, L.21 – p.150, L.1.)
Richard Coleman then testified that about fifteen minutes after the officers left, when he
was alone at his house, Mr. Coleman entered the house.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.150, Ls.2-9, p.151, L.22 –
p.152, L.3.)  Richard Coleman testified that one of his pistols was in Mr. Coleman’s hand.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.152, Ls.8-12.)  He testified he had not given his son permission to have the pistol in
his possession.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.155, Ls.2-7.)  Richard Coleman testified his son was in a rage and
waving the pistol around, but did not point the pistol at him.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.155, Ls.8-15.)  He
testified  Mr.  Coleman  pointed  the  pistol  towards  his  own  head  one  time.   (Tr.  Vol.  I,  p.155,
Ls.16-17.)
According  to  Richard  Coleman,  Mr.  Coleman asked  him to  help  pull  the  Jimmy out  of
the  snow  again.   (See Tr. Vol. I, p.157, L.18 – p.158, L.5.)  Richard Coleman also testified
Mr. Coleman punched the pantry door in the house, leaving a hole.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.158, Ls.16-25,
p.159, L.16 – p.160, L.2.)  He testified he helped Mr. Coleman pull the Jimmy out of the snow,
and Mr. Coleman then left.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.163, L.11 – p.164, L.20.)
On cross-examination, Richard Coleman testified he had not mentioned any damage to
the pantry door in his written statements to the police.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.172, L.14 – p.174, L.21.)
3
Officer Robert Elam with the Boundary County Sheriff’s Office testified that when he arrested
Mr. Coleman later that day, Mr. Coleman had Richard Coleman’s pistol in his vehicle.  (See
Tr. Vol. I, p.185, L.2 – p.187, L.8.)
After  the  State  rested,  Mr.  Coleman  made  a  motion  for  a  judgment  of  acquittal  under
Idaho Criminal Rule 29 on the exhibition of a deadly weapon count.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.189, L.25 –
p.190, L.23.)  Mr. Coleman asserted, “[o]ne of the elements of the crime is that it occur in the
presence of two or more persons.  The evidence that’s been presented today is that
Richard Coleman and Geoffrey Coleman were the only two people who were present at the
time.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.190, L.24 – p.191, L.3.)  Mr. Coleman interpreted the statute to require the
presence of “two persons other than the defendant in order for someone to be guilty of exhibition
of a deadly weapon.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.191, Ls.4-6.)
The State argued, “the defendant is included in that two or more persons.”  (Tr. Vol. I,
p.192, Ls.24-25.)  Mr. Coleman responded, “I don’t think the statute would be written that way if
the defendant counted as one of the two people.  If that were the case, all he would have to do is
to exhibit the deadly weapon in the presence of one other person.  It wouldn’t say in the presence
of two or more people.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.194, Ls.7-12.)  Mr. Coleman asserted, “[t]he plain
language of the statute is that the defendant himself does not count as one of the two people.”
(Tr. Vol. I, p.194, Ls.15-17.)
The district court determined that for “exhibition or use of a deadly weapon, the case law
makes it clear it is a lesser included of aggravated assault.  And clearly aggravated assault just
requires two people, two or more.  You have to have the person with a weapon and the person
[who] is assaulted.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.194, L.22 – p.195, L.2.)  The district court read the statute as
“trying to make clear that if you are exhibiting a weapon in a rude, angry and threatening manner
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and you’re the only one there, that maybe somebody took a video of it somehow or a picture, or
caught it on a camera, that doesn’t constitute the crime.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.195, L.9.)  The district
court denied the Rule 29 motion, determining the statute “means that two people, two or more
persons can include the person with the weapon, and there has to be at least one other person.”
(Tr. Vol. I, p.195, Ls.10-13.)
Mr. Coleman’s girlfriend, Kim Christensen, testified for the defense that she was in the
Jimmy when she saw Mr. Coleman and Richard Coleman arguing, but she could not necessarily
hear what they were saying.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.216, L.24 – p.217, L.7, p.220, L.22 – p.221, L.3.)
She saw Richard Coleman get off the ATV, and Mr. Coleman got on it.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.221, L.18
– p.222, L.23.)  She testified she then saw the ATV jerk forward and run over Richard Coleman.
(See Tr. Vol. I, p.224, Ls.12-18.)  Ms. Christensen testified Mr. Coleman immediately backed up
the ATV, tried to apologize and appeared to be upset.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.225, L.17 – p.226, L.25.)
After she saw Mr. Coleman did not need assistance to stand up, she left the area on foot because
she was upset.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.227, Ls.1-23.)  Ms. Christensen testified Mr. Coleman had called
her after the incident and stated:  “Sometimes you have to lie for the greater good.”  (Tr. Vol. II,
p.251, L.17 – p.252, L.4.)
Mr. Coleman testified that the argument he had with his father was about the Jimmy still
being stuck after his father plowed the driveway, and his father not wanting to help.  (Tr. Vol. II,
p.291, L.17 – p.292, L.3.)  After being unable to get the Jimmy up any further, Mr. Coleman left
the vehicle and Richard Coleman got off the ATV, and they began to argue.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.293,
Ls.4-11.)  Mr. Coleman testified he did not tackle his father off the ATV.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.293,
L.24 – p.294, L.5.)  According to Mr. Coleman, he got on the ATV to pile the snow so he could
get the Jimmy out.  (See Tr. Vol. II, p.294, Ls.6-16.)  He testified that when he tried to put the
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ATV into reverse, it went forward.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.299, Ls.10-12.)  Mr. Coleman testified that he
was in shock when he realized he had run over his father, and felt horrible about it.  (Tr. Vol. II,
p.300, Ls.16-21.)  He testified he did not intentionally run over his father with the ATV.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.301, Ls.5-7.)
Mr.  Coleman  also  testified  he  had  asked  two  days  prior  to  borrow  the  pistol  from
Richard Coleman.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.301, Ls.15-22.)  He testified his father allowed him to shoot the
pistol  for  target  practice.   (See Tr. Vol. II, p.301, L.23 – p.302, L.18)  He admitted to having
possession of the pistol the day of the incident, but denied any intent to keep it.  (Tr. Vol. II,
p.302, L.19 – p.303, L.10.)  Mr. Coleman testified that when he went back inside his father’s
house, he had the pistol in his possession.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.304, Ls.8-18.)  He testified he held the
gun to his own head and asked his father to help get his vehicle out.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.305, Ls.5-10.)
Mr. Coleman further testified he did not damage the pantry door.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.306, Ls.3-5.)
The jury found Mr. Coleman guilty of exhibition of a deadly weapon, and found him not
guilty of the other three counts.  (R., pp.173-74.)  For exhibition of a deadly weapon, the district
court sentenced Mr. Coleman to eighty days in jail, with credit for eighty days served.




Did  the  district  court  err  when  it  denied  Mr.  Coleman’s  Idaho  Criminal  Rule  29  motion  for  a
judgment of acquittal regarding the exhibition of a deadly weapon count?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Coleman’s Idaho Criminal Rule 29 Motion For A
Judgment Of Acquittal Regarding The Exhibition Of A Deadly Weapon Count
A. Introduction
Mr. Coleman asserts the district court erred when it denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 29
motion for a judgment of acquittal regarding the exhibition of a deadly weapon count.  The State
did not present competent evidence that Mr. Coleman exhibited the pistol in the presence of two
or more persons, as required by the plain language of I.C. § 18-3303.  Thus, the district court
erred when it denied Mr. Coleman’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.
B. Standard Of Review
At the time of Mr. Coleman’s trial, Idaho Criminal Rule 29 provided that “[t]he court on
motion of the defendant or on its  own motion shall  order the entry of judgment of acquittal  of
one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information or complaint after the evidence on
either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or
offenses.”  I.C.R. 29(a) (2016).1  The Idaho Supreme Court has held, “[i]n reviewing the denial
of a motion for judgment of acquittal, the appellate court must independently consider the
evidence in the record and determine whether a reasonable mind could conclude that the
defendant’s  guilt  as  to  such  material  evidence  of  the  offense  was  proven  beyond  a  reasonable
doubt.” State v. Clark, 161 Idaho 372, 374 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The
relevant inquiry is not whether the appellate court “would find the defendant to be guilty beyond
1 Rule 29(a) has since been amended to read, in relevant part, “[a]fter the prosecution closes its
evidence  or  after  the  close  of  all  the  evidence,  the  court  on  defendant’s  motion  or  on  its  own
motion, must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient
to sustain a conviction.”  I.C.R. 29(a) (effective July 1, 2017).
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a reasonable doubt, but whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational  trier  of  fact  could  have  found  the  essential  elements  of  the  crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
C. The State Did Not Present Competent Evidence That Mr. Coleman Exhibited The Pistol
In The Presence Of Two Or More Persons
The State did not present competent evidence that Mr. Coleman exhibited the pistol in the
presence of two more more persons, as required by I.C. § 18-3303.  Section 18-3303 provides
that “[e]very person who, not in necessary self-defense, in the presence of two (2) or more
persons, draws or exhibits any deadly weapon in a rude, angry and threatening manner, or who,
in any manner, unlawfully uses the same, in any fight or quarrel, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”
I.C. § 18-3303.  The Idaho Court of Appeals has held “the presence of two or more people is an
essential element of the crime.” State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 669 (Ct. App. 1986).
Here, any rational trier of fact could not have found the presence of two or more persons
essential element beyond a reasonable doubt.  Richard Coleman testified he was alone in his
house when Mr. Coleman came in with the pistol.   (See Tr. Vol. I, p.149, L.21 – p.151, L.25.)
Further, Richard Coleman did not testify any other person showed up while Mr. Coleman was
displaying the pistol.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.151, L.7 – p.164, L.20.)  Thus, even after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the State never presented competent
evidence that Mr. Coleman exhibited the pistol in the presence of two or more persons.  Because
any rational trier of fact could not have found that essential element beyond a reasonable doubt,
see Mason, 111 Idaho at 669, the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to sustain
Mr. Coleman’s conviction for exhibition of a deadly weapon. See Clark, 161 Idaho at 374;
I.C.R. 29(a).
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D. The Plain Language Of I.C. § 18-3303 Does Not Support The District Court’s
Interpretation Of The Statute
Although the evidence presented by the State was insufficient, the district court denied
Mr. Coleman’s Rule 29 motion, determining that under I.C. § 18-3303, “two or more persons can
include  the  person  with  the  weapon,  and  there  has  to  be  at  least  one  other  person.”   (See
Tr. Vol. I, p.195, Ls.10-13.)  However, the plain language of Section 18-3303 does not support
the district court’s interpretation.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held, “[t]he interpretation of a statute must begin with the
literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning;
and the statute must be construed as a whole.  If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not
construe it, but simply follows the law as written.” Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151
Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Appellate courts exercise free review
over statutory interpretation, because it is a question of law. State v. Leary, 160 Idaho 349,
352 (2016).
As discussed above, Section 18-3303 provides, “[e]very person who, not in necessary
self-defense, in the presence of two (2) or more persons, draws or exhibits any deadly weapon in
a rude, angry and threatening manner . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.”  I.C. § 18-3303.  The
statute prohibits a “person” from exhibiting a deadly weapon in a rude, angry and threatening
manner “in the presence of two (2) or more persons.”  Thus, the plain language of Section 18-
3303 contemplates the prohibited act would occur when a defendant so displays a deadly weapon
in the presence of two or more persons, other than the defendant.
State v. Mason, an Idaho Court of Appeals case interpreting Section 18-3303, supports
this construction of the statute’s plain language.  In Mason, the defendant asserted the district
court committed reversible error, because the district court refused to give a defense instruction
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on exhibition of a deadly weapon as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Mason, 111
Idaho at 668.
The  Idaho  Court  of  Appeals  held  “not  all  of  the  essential  elements  of  the  crime  of
exhibiting a deadly weapon were included among the allegations in the information filed against
Mason.” Id. at 668-69.  The information charged that the defendant
knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the apparent ability to do
so, commit[ted] an intentional, unlawful threat to do violence to the person of
another,  by  word  and  act  against  one  Patricia  Stapleton,  with  a  deadly  weapon,
without the intent to kill and created a well-founded fear that such violence was
imminent,  to  wit:  The  said  James  Mason pointed  a  handgun at  the  said  Patricia
Stapleton and threatened to blow her guts out.
Id. at 669 (alteration in original).  The Court of Appeals held the presence of two or more people,
an essential element of exhibition of a deadly weapon, “was not contained in the allegations of
the information; therefore the crime of exhibiting a deadly weapon was not an included offense
under the theory that its elements were charged ‘as the manner or means’ of the assault.” Id.
However, the Mason Court also held the crime of exhibition of a deadly weapon was an
included  offense  under  a  different  theory,  namely  that  the  evidence  showed  the  crime  was
committed in the commission of another offense.2 Id.  This  was  because,  “from the  evidence
2 The Idaho Supreme Court later clarified that “[t]here are two theories under which a particular
offense  may  be  determined  to  be  a  lesser  offense  of  a  charged  offense.” State v. Curtis, 130
Idaho 522, 524 (1997).  Under the first theory, the “statutory theory, an offense is not considered
a lesser included offense of the charged offense unless it is necessarily so under the statutory
definition of the charge offense.” Id. (citing Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 211 (1986)).  Under
the second theory, the “pleading theory,” an offense “is an included offense if it is alleged in the
information as a means or element of the commission of the higher offense.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
More  recently,  the  Idaho  Supreme  Court  held  in  a  lewd  conduct  case,  “it  is  of  no
consequence that there was evidence admitted during the trial that would support” a lesser
included charge of sexual abuse. See State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 530 (2011).  The Flegel
Court held, “[t]he prosecutor had no authority to file an amended indictment charging a crime
that was not an included offense under the original indictment, under either the statutory theory
or the pleading theory.” Id.
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presented, the jury could have concluded that Mason—not acting in self-defense—and in the
presence of Stapleton and at least three other persons (her companion and the two witnesses,
Johnson and Thorpe) exhibited a deadly weapon (his revolver) in a rude, angry and threatening
manner.” Id.  Thus, the Court of Appeals held the district court erred when it refused to give the
requested exhibiting a deadly weapon instruction. Id.
In sum, the allegations in the information in Mason did not include the presence of two or
more persons essential element for exhibition of a deadly weapon, because the information
alleged the defendant used a handgun in the presence of only one person (Patricia Stapleton)
other than the defendant. See id.  But the evidence presented contained that same element,
because a jury could have concluded from the evidence that the defendant used the weapon in the
presence of at least four other persons. See id.  Thus, Mason indicates the plain language of
Section 18-3303 does not support the district court’s interpretation of the statute.
A comparison of Section 18-3303 with a related statute, former I.C. § 18-3302, also
demonstrates the statute’s plain language does not support the district court’s interpretation.  The
Idaho Legislature enacted former Section 18-3302 alongside Section 18-3303 in 1972.
1972 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 336, § 1, p.911.  Before its repeal in 1990, see 1990 Idaho Sess.
Laws, ch. 256, § 1, p.732, former Section 18-3302 provided that “[i]f any person . . . shall, in the
presence of one (1) or more persons, exhibit any deadly or dangerous weapon in a rude, angry, or
threatening manner . . . he shall, upon conviction,” be guilty of a misdemeanor.  1972 Idaho Sess.
Laws, ch. 336, § 1, p.911; see State v. McNary, 100 Idaho 244, 246 n.1 (1979).
If the Idaho Legislature had intended for Section 18-3303 to work as the district court
interpreted it, to require that only one person other than the defendant need be present, it would
have written the statute to mirror the wording of former Section 18-3302, with its “presence of
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one (1) or more persons” element.  That the legislature instead opted to require the “presence of
two (2) or more persons” in Section 18-3303 further shows the plain language of the statute does
not support the district court’s interpretation.3
The plain language of Section 18-3303 does not support the district court’s interpretation
that the defendant may count as one of the two persons for the presence of two or more persons
element of exhibition of a deadly weapon. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 893.  Under the plain
language of the statute, two persons other than the defendant must be present.  I.C. § 18-3303.
But the State, as shown above, did not present competent evidence that Mr. Coleman exhibited
the pistol in the presence of two or more persons.  The evidence presented by the State was
therefore insufficient to sustain Mr. Coleman’s conviction for exhibition of a deadly weapon.
Thus, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Coleman’s Rule 29 motion for a
judgment of acquittal regarding the exhibition of a deadly weapon count. See I.C.R. 29(a).
Because there was insufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Coleman’s conviction on that count, this
Court must vacate his conviction.
3 Additionally, if the “two (2) or more persons” in Section 18-3303 are considered to be victims
of  the  offense,  it  would  follow  that,  under  the  district  court’s  interpretation  of  the  statute,
Mr. Coleman would be his own victim.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Coleman respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
district court’s Judgment, because the State did not present sufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction for exhibition of a deadly weapon.
DATED this 23rd day of August, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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